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ABTRACT: This work examines the role of expertise in negotiations in the European 
Union (EU), distinguishing between content-specific expertise, procedural expertise 
and  shared  training  and  professional  outlook of  experts.  It  reviews  a  composite 
literature, identifying  the  functions  and  the  causal  mechanisms  through  which 
expertise may have an impact on negotiation processes and outcomes as a socialising, 
cognitive, legitimasing, and operational device. Finally, it puts forward proposals for 
further  research,  formulating  testable  hypotheses  about the  scope  conditions
concerning the negotiating arenas and policy areas under which expertise is most (or 
least) likely to affect EU negotiations.
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The  European Union  (EU) is  often presented as  a technocratic  project, driven  by 
experts and informed by expertise. However, there is a very limited body of literature 
specifically  dealing  with the  role  of  ‘expertise’ and  ‘experts’, in  the  process  of 
institution-building  and  policy-making  in  the  EU.  One  notable  exception  are  the 
works of Radaelli (1995, 1999a, see also Harcourt and Radaelli 1999), which tackle 
these themes head on, albeit the main focus of these works is on the policy process or 
the EU governance system more generally, rather than negotiations. Other scholarly 
works that consider, albeit indirectly, the role of expertise and experts in the EU are 
the studies of committee governance, reviewed in Section 2.
This work explores the issue of how expertise may affect negotiations in the EU, with 
reference to both the negotiation processes and the outcomes. For the purpose of this 
paper, the definition of ‘expertise’ coincides with: ‘content specific knowledge’, about 
the subject specific matter of negotiations; ‘procedural knowledge’ about the process 
of  negotiation  (the  distinction  between content specific  knowledge and  procedural 
knowledge is pointed out by Tallberg 2006), and ‘shared training and professional 
outlook’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Chwieroth 2007). The focus here is mainly on 
the  first  and  third  definitions  of  expertise,  because  the  second  definition  largely 
coincides with negotiating skills. 
The role of technical knowledge in EU negotiations should be examined together with 
the role of ‘experts’ interacting in these fora. ‘Experts’ are policy-makers that master
technical knowledge. They tend to be civil servants, based either in the member states 3
or in EU institutions. Academics, professionals based in think tanks and specialists 
from industry are not included in this definition of experts because they hardly ever 
participate directly to EU negotiations, even though in certain technical and complex 
policy areas considerable subject specific knowledge can be provided by industry, 
academia and professional lobbyists. 
Having provided a working definition of ‘expertise’ and ‘experts’, Section 2 reviews 
the literature identifying the causal mechanisms through which expertise may have an 
impact  on  the  negotiation  processes and  the  outcomes.  Section  3 puts  forward 
proposals for future research, elaborating empirically testable hypotheses concerning  
the  scope  conditions  under  which  expertise  is  most  (or  least)  likely  to  affect  EU 
negotiations. The leading questions that inform this work are: What have we learned 
so  far  about  the  role  of  knowledge  in  EU  negotiations?  What  gaps  exist  in  our 
understanding and how should we go about addressing these gaps, empirically and/or 
methodologically?  The  paper includes  some  illustrative  examples  in  the  field  of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and financial services rule-making in the EU. 
These two policy areas are particularly amenable to the analysis of expertise in EU 
negotiations because they are technical policy areas, which are also politically salient. 
One could expect both expertise and traditional bargaining to play a prominent role in 
negotiations.
It  is argued that it  is important  to  investigate how  technical  knowledge  influence 
negotiations  in  the  EU  because this  can  shed  new light  onto  the  core  questions 
informing  this  special  issue and  more  precisely:  whether  and  under  what 
circumstances  actors  engage  in  bargaining  or  arguing/  or  problem  solving;  what 4
affects  the  ‘bargaining’  power  of  actors  in  the  negotiating  process;  and,  how 
coalitions are formed in EU negotiations.
2. Taking stock from a composite literature
As mentioned before, there is not a specific body of literature discussing the role of 
expertise in EU negotiations, even though experts and expertise feature in the studies 
of EU committees. Hence, this literature review begins by examining the body of 
scholarly works dealing with committee governance in the EU and it subsequently
examines other approaches - mainly drawn from comparative politics, public policy
and international relations - which explore the role of expertise and experts in policy 
making. This review of the literature is organised according to analytical categories 
reflecting  the  various  ‘functions’ that  can  be  performed  by  expertise in  EU 
negotiations: as a socialising, cognitive, legitimasing, and operational device. Each
approach is examined in the context of the literature it originally came from and how 
it has been applied in the EU context. Finally, the causal mechanisms through which 
expertise  may  have an impact  on the  negotiation  processes and the  outcomes are 
identified.
Expertise as a socialising device
The literature on committee governance in the EU includes studies of the socialisation 
process taking place in the various committees (Lewis 2005; Beyers 2005; Beyers and 
Trondal 2004; Egeberg et al. 2003, Fouilleux et al. 2005; Trondal 2001; Trondal and 
Veggeland 2003), as well as the literature on comitology (Pollack 2003; Joerges and 5
Vos 1999) and the study of specific committees (see the special issue of the Journal 
of European Integration 2008). 
The vast majority of the scholarly works on committee governance in the EU that are 
relevant to the role of expertise explore the process of socialization, which can be 
defined  in  different  ways, but  which tends to  coincide  with  the  acquisition  of  a 
supranational logic, the willingness to compromise and the internalisation of norms as 
a  result  of  interactions  in  the  committees.  It  is  however  possible  to  distinguish 
between  internalization  of  supranational  norms  and  internalization  of  specific 
normative views about public policy, especially in committees dominated by expertise 
(Quaglia et al. 2008). In highly technical committees, participants, although formally 
representing their countries, can be socialized to a technocratic vision that privileges 
expertise  and  Pareto-efficient  decision-making  rather  than  the  national  interest 
(Majone 1999: 295–6).
Another, often neglected, type of socialization concerns the specific values or policy 
paradigms  (Quaglia  et  al.  2008).  One  example  is  the  ‘stability-oriented’ 
macroeconomic paradigm that prevails in the Economic and Financial Committee (the 
former Monetary Committee) and in the forerunner of the ECB, the Committee of 
Central Bank Governors (Dyson and Featherstone 1999, Verdun 1999). Recent work 
by Banducci and Radaelli (2008) distinguishes the impact of the different types of 
socialisation on experts working in EU committees in several policy areas.
This literature ties in with the literature on socialisation in international organisations 
(Barnett and Finnemore 1999), and the effects of the presence of a shared educational 6
background (Chiewroth 2007) and professional outlook (Marcussen 2009) amongst 
policy makers. Accordingly, technical language, professional training, an evidence-
based approach (Majone 1989) and the interaction in the technical fora facilitate the 
socialisation process amongst experts.
The causal mechanism identified by this body of scholarly literature is that expertise, 
mainly  in  the  form  of  a  shared  training and  professional  outlook,  facilitates
socialisation in certain negotiating arenas, such as ‘committees of experts’, which, in 
turn, facilitates the process of negotiation and the reaching of an agreement. In these 
cases,  expertise  is  an  independent  or  intervening  variable.  At  the  same  time,  the 
development of shared expertise is also facilitated by the interaction in (certain) EU 
committees, notably ‘technical’ committees, in which the matters discussed have a 
highly technical content. In these cases, expertise is a dependent variable.
Expertise as a cognitive device
In comparative politics, the concept of policy paradigm was originally developed by 
Peter Hall (Hall 1993, 1989) in conjunction with historical institutionalism. Policy 
paradigms,  which  are  the  overarching  frameworks  of  ideas  that  structure  policy-
making  in  a  particular  field,  comprise  beliefs  concerning  policy  objectives, 
instruments and strategies (Hall 1989). Thus, policy paradigms, and their different 
components,  help  policy  makers  to  chart  policies,  identifying  objectives,  devising 
strategies and selecting instruments. Paradigms are generally rooted in, or informed 
by,  a  specific  body  of  technical  knowledge.  They  are  intersubjective  beliefs 
expressing  both  individual and  collective intentionality, and therefore  they can  be 
applied as independent or intervening variables to explain the behaviour of individual 7
policy-makers  as  well  as  groups  of  policy-makers  (Ruggie  1998). In  the  EU, 
McNamara (1998), Marcussen (2000) and Quaglia (2004) have traced the influence of 
specific bodies of economic ideas (or policy paradigms) in facilitating and shaping the 
coming about of EMU. Parsons (2000, 2002) has analysed the influence of specific 
bodies of ideas in shaping France’s policy towards the EU. 
A similar approach, although with more emphasis on the role of technical knowledge 
in a transnational dimension, was developed in the field of international relations to 
explain international public policy and policy coordination. Epistemic communities
are  networks  of  ‘professionals  with  recognised  expertise  and  competence  in  a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue area’ (Haas 1992: 3). Such communities are formed by individuals 
who share the same world-view (or episteme) and in particular four aspects of it: ‘a 
shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale’; 
‘shared causal beliefs’; a ‘shared notion of validity’; ‘a common policy enterprise’ to 
which their professional competence is directed. This typology of beliefs bears some
resemblance to the one applied in the advocacy coalition approach, reviewed below. 
The epistemic community theory formulates international policy coordination as the 
dependent variable, whereas states’ interests become an intervening variable, framed 
by knowledge, which is the independent variable. This perspective highlights the role 
that networks of knowledge-based experts cutting across national boundaries have in 
helping states to identify their interests and frame policy. The focus is on individuals, 
generally  experts  and  their  technical  beliefs,  not  on  politicians.  In  the  EU,  Amy 
Verdun (1999) characterises the EU central bankers gathered in the Delors Committee 8
in 1989 as an ‘epistemic community’ active in the creation of EMU and in drafting 
the blueprint of the European Central Bank (ECB).
In the 1990s, the advocacy coalition approach was developed in the field of public 
policy by giving particular attention to actors and their beliefs. An advocacy coalition
is composed of ‘actors from various governmental and private organisations who both 
share a set of normative and causal beliefs and engage in a non-trivial degree of co-
ordinated activity over time’ (Sabatier 1998: 99). ‘The belief system’ of a coalition is 
organised into a ‘hierarchical, tripartite structure’: the ‘deep core’ of the shared belief 
system  includes  basic ontological and  normative beliefs; the ‘policy core’  beliefs, 
which represent the causal perceptions by the coalition and are its fundamental ‘glue’; 
and the secondary aspects of the coalition’s belief system, which can vary somewhat 
among different members (Sabatier 1998). The tripartite structure of belief system is 
also reminiscent of the literature on policy paradigms of the late 1980s. 
The advocacy coalition approach is particularly fruitful in order to assess the role that 
technical knowledge – the independent or intervening variable - plays in the policy 
process  (Sabatier 1998).  It emphasises  the process  of ‘policy learning’ (Meseguer 
2005) which in turn might trigger a process of ‘policy transfer’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 
1996,  Bulmer  et  al.  2007).  Both  the  processes  of  learning  and  transfer  can  be 
facilitated by the presence and interaction of like-minded experts that value expertise 
in the policy debate.  
In the EU, this approach, together with the concept of policy narrative, has been used 
by Radaelli (1999b) to explain policy making in taxation policy in the EU. Dudley 9
and  Richardson  (1999) have  used  the  concept  of  advocacy  coalitions  in  order  to 
explain EU policymaking in the steel sector, arguing that ideas and interests are ‘not 
separate entities, only analytically separable ones’ (Jacobsen 1995: 309), especially in 
the economic field. Following the same approach, Quaglia (2008b) has highlighted
the importance of competing paradigms concerning financial services regulation in 
order to explain why the completion of the single financial market in the EU has 
proved to be so difficult.
According to this literature expertise in the form of content specific knowledge is a 
cognitive device, helping actors to evaluate their individual or collective interests. The 
causal mechanism through which expertise may affect the process of negotiation and 
the outcome is that a shared body of technical knowledge can lead to the identification
of similar interests. It also contributes to framing issues, such as the creation of EU 
institutions, or the development of EU policies, in a relatively consensual way. 
For  example,  the  ‘sound  money’  ideas  (meaning  the  stability-oriented  economic 
paradigm) that originated in Germany and came to be shared by macroeconomic elites 
in the EU facilitated the reaching of an agreement on EMU and its shape (Dyson 1994, 
McNamara 1998, Marcussen 1999). Moreover, the broad consensus in the economic 
literature on the principle of central bank independence (for a review see Cukierman 
1992, Eijifinger and de Haan 1996), which was also shared by macroeconomic policy 
makers, and the perceived successful model provided by the German Bundesbank, 
facilitated the reaching of an agreement on the establishment of the European Central 
Bank, as well as the specific features of EMU (Dyson 1994, Verdun 1999, McNamara 
1998, Marcussen 2000). 10
By contrast, the absence of a shared body of technical knowledge and even more so 
the presence of competing technical paradigms complicates the negotiation process, 
making  the  reaching  of  an  agreement  more  difficult.  For  example,  unlike  for  the 
principle  of  central  bank  independence,  there  is  no  agreement  in  the  economic 
literature and amongst macroeconomic policy makers on the best model for banking 
supervision,  and  more  generally  financial  services  supervision  (Busch  2004). 
Moreover,  there  are  different  supervisory  models  in  Europe  (for  an  overview  see 
Masciandaro 2005). Hence, when the ECB was set up one of the points on which it 
was difficult to find an agreement  was  whether or not it should have supervisory 
competence (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; interview, London, 5 December 2005). 
Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate as to whether or not central banks should 
engage in banking supervision as is the case for example, in Italy, and Spain, and 
whether  a  single  supervisor  for  the  entire  financial  sector,  similar  to  the  British 
Financial  Services  Authority  model,  provides  more  effective  supervision.  Even 
amongst experts (financial regulators and supervisors) there is no consensus on the 
best model for financial supervision in the EU.
Expertise as legitimasing device
The approaches reviewed so far are mainly drawn from the literature on comparative 
politics and public policy (for a review see Blyth 1997, Jacobsen 1995, Finnemore 
and Sikkink 2001).  To this, one should add ‘soft’ constructivist approaches, whose 
theoretical focus is the constitutive role of ideational elements in international and EU 
politics (for constructivist approaches applied to the EU see the special edition of the 
Journal of European Public Policy, in particular the article by Christiansen, Jorgensen 11
and  Wiener  1999).  There  are  different  clusters  of  constructivism  identified  in  the 
literature: conventional, critical, and postmodernist (Ruggie 1998; Katzenstein et al.
1998; Checkel 2003) or sociological and Wittgensteinian/interpretative (Christiansen 
et  al.  1999).  These different  strands  of  social  constructivism  formulate  different 
epistemological programmes: they have specific foci and preferred methodologies.
The  main  discussion  here  is  on  soft  constructivism,  meaning  the  sociological 
(conventional)  current  that  applies  positivist  methodologies  to  empirical  studies 
(Shimmelfennig 2003; Lewis 2003, Checkel 2003, Risse 2000, Marcussen et al. 1999). 
Social constructivism analyses the interactions amongst entities in the international 
arena by specifically looking at the alterations of political actors’ constitutive features, 
their identities and interests. Social constructivism examines practices of deliberation, 
persuasion  and argumentation  (Checkel 1999a,  2001b;  Risse  2000) leading to  the 
reconfiguration of one’s identity and interests. Social constructivism highlights the 
legitimating function of ideas (socially constructed elements) and by extension, for 
the purpose of this article, of technical knowledge. 
In  the  EMU  literature,  Risse  et  al. (1999) and  Marcussen  et  al.  (1999)  have 
highlighted  the  role  of  socially  constructed  elements,  first  and  foremost  national 
identities,  in shaping  member states approaches towards  EMU. McNamara (2002) 
points  out  that  in  the  making  of  EMU  the  spreading  of  the  idea  of  central  bank 
independence worldwide provided some sort of perceived legitimation to this model.  
Marcussen (2009) discusses the ‘scientisation’ of central banking, whereby legitimate 
decision making is based on expertise and evidence, and is almost ‘apolitical’.12
Expertise mainly as content specific expertise as well as professional outlook can act 
as a  legitimating device  performing a  normative or constitutive function, defining 
what  is,  or  is  not  appropriate  in  a  certain  policy  (Surel  2000),  providing  the 
intersubjective bases of social action and social order (Wendt 1999; Ruggie 1998), 
and the language in which to communicate (Laffey and Weldes 1997; Yee 1996). The 
normative function of ideas is empowered in policy domains characterised by high 
density  of  international  institutionalisation  and  a  high  degree  of  international  and 
transnational normative activity (Checkel 1999c, 533), for example, the promotion of 
human rights regimes. 
Expertise as an operational device 
An influential stream of research on ideas in the early 1990s adopted rational choice 
institutionalism (Goldstein  and  Keohane  1993,  Garrett  and  Weingast  1993), 
considering ideas, including specific bodies of technical knowledge, as intervening 
variables, providing focal points of agreement for policy makers and for the formation 
of  domestic  coalitions.  Similarly  to  Hall  (1989),  Goldstein  and  Keohane  (1993) 
distinguished  between  ‘world  views’, ‘principled  beliefs’ and  ‘causal beliefs’, and 
emphasised their  individualistic  grounding.  In  these  empirically-grounded  studies
different  sets of ideas were  detected as influential  in  certain policy areas and  the 
combination of ideas was regarded as instrumental in constructing policy coalitions, 
as Garrett and Weingast (1993) point out in the making of EMU.
Expertise in the form of technical knowledge may affect the negotiating process and 
outcome  by performing a  political  function  of  coalition  formation.  The  causal 
mechanism  through  which  this  takes  place  is the  identification  of focal  points  of 13
agreement  for  policy-makers,  and  socio-economic  and  political  forces, especially 
when different sets of ideas are at play, and ideational packages can be formed. For 
example, in the area of European monetary integration, foreign policy beliefs (or ideas 
about Europe) meet economic ideas (Risse, Engelman-Martin, Knopf and Roscher 
1999). Most of the time, ideas and interests reinforce each other in the formation of 
coalition (cf Jacobsen 1995), as suggested by Quaglia  (2008b) in the negotiations 
concerning the making of the so-called Lamfalussy directives concerning securities 
trading.
Other rationalist approaches, such as leadership theories consider technical knowledge 
as a resource in the negotiating process providing policy makers with an intangible 
asset to be deployed in negotiations. Expertise can therefore provide extra leverage to 
the actors mastering it (cf Tallberg 2006). In this case, expertise affects the bargaining 
power of actors, giving them an extra edge in policy debates. Technical knowledge 
can  be an  intangible  asset that  strengthens  the position  of  the  policy-makers  that 
master such expertise - it substitutes power in certain policy areas (Radaelli 1995). 
Mastering of technical knowledge represents a source of power in EU negotiations, 
providing  extra  leverage  in  the  discussion  (cf  Wallace  2005).  Paraphrasing  Haas 
(1990),  there  are  instances  when  knowledge  is  power,  which  is  not  to  say  that 
knowledge is the main source of bargaining power in EU negotiations. 
For example, amongst central banks, the Bank of Italy has consistently invested a 
considerable amount of resources in order to develop in house cutting edge economic 
knowledge to be deployed in policy debates, both domestically and in international 
fora. In contrast, the Bundesbank was an independent central bank and a powerful 14
domestic and international actor in its own right until the creation of EMU, but did not 
feel the need to do so (Quaglia 2008a). This approach changed once it joined the 
Eurosystem, where access to advanced technical knowledge provided extra leverage 
in  policy making.  Consequently,  several central banks, including the Bundesbank, 
have stepped up their research departments (Eijffinger, de Haan and Koedijk 2002). 
There is often (but not always), a correlation between the issue salience, the intensity 
of preferences for certain actors and the degree of technical expertise they can master 
on that specific subject. For example, Luxemburg, which has a large financial sector 
compared to the size of its economy and population, masters considerable expertise in 
financial services, and invests considerable resources in policy making in this sector. 
On the other hand, size matters indirectly as well, in that one can assume that the most 
powerful actors, such as the large member states, on average, have more expertise and 
human resources available to them. For example, the UK, France and Germany are 
generally seen as the most well resourced in terms of expertise (technical knowledge) 
and experts (human resources) in the negotiating process on financial services.
According to these approaches, the causal mechanism through which expertise in the 
form  of  technical  knowledge  and  process  specific  knowledge  may  affect  the 
negotiating process and outcome is by acting as an operational resource that increases 
the bargaining power of actors, providing intangible assets.
Proposals for further research15
The review of various bodies of scholarly works touching upon the role of expertise in 
negotiations in the EU (and elsewhere) underscores that there are several sometimes 
overlapping  causal  mechanisms  through  which  expertise  may  affect  negotiation
processes and  the  outcomes.  Yet,  we  still  know  relatively  little about  the  scope 
conditions under which expertise is most likely (or less likely) to affect negotiations 
in  the EU through  the causal  mechanisms identified  in the previous  section. It is 
however possible  to  tease  out testable  implications  that  can  be  subject  to  future 
empirical  research. The scope  conditions  are  formulated  as  falsifiable hypotheses
about under what conditions expertise matters in EU negotiations. They concern: the 
arena of negotiations and the policy area being negotiated. 
H1. Expertise is most likely to affect negotiation processes and outcomes in technical 
arenas, especially if participants have a shared professional training and outlook.
Indeed, in technical fora (e.g. highly specialised committees), participants are likely to 
be socialised in the same professional culture, share similar cognitive and legitimising 
maps and value expertise as a resource.  Hence, for example, in the policy areas of 
EMU and financial services regulation, one would expect expertise to play a greater 
role in the negotiations taking place in gatherings of central bankers, who have a 
strong shared professional outlook (Marcussen 2009, Verdun 1999), rather than in 
gathering of finance ministers, who tend to have diverse professional backgrounds.
H2. Expertise is most likely to affect negotiation processes and outcomes in arenas 
located at lower levels.16
In  these  arenas,  negotiations are  likely to  be less  ‘politicised’ and  more evidence 
based,  privileging  knowledge-based arguments  over  political  ones (Majone  1989). 
Hence, for example, in the policy areas of EMU and financial services regulation, one 
would expect expertise to play a greater role in the negotiations taking place in the
council working groups and the Lamfalussy committees, respectively, rather than in 
high level ministerial meetings (e.g. Ecofin Council).
H3. Expertise is most likely to affect negotiation processes and outcomes in complex 
policy areas, with low political salience, shielded from public scrutiny.
These features increase the length of the causal chain and reduce the traceability of 
policy (Radaelli 1999a). An example is international monetary policy (Odell 1982). In 
the EU, one would expect expertise to play a greater role in the negotiations of EMU 
and  financial  services,  which  have  several  technical  aspects, deal  with  complex 
matters, and are generally the domains of core executives (cf Dyson and Featherstone 
1999), than in the negotiations, for example, on EU structural funds or the EU budget, 
which have a lower technical content and higher political salience. 
H4. Expertise is most likely to affect the negotiation process and its outcome in the 
absence of significant clear cut competing interests.
This  tends to happen when the policy areas negotiated have the characteristics of 
public goods and interest groups have little incentive to lobby for them (Gowa 1983), 
and/or when there are no clear-cut winners and losers (McNamara 1998) - thus, policy 
constituencies are undefined or cross cutting. In the EU, one should be able to detect a 17
difference in the role played by expertise in two equally technical policy areas, with 
different public good content. In this respect, financial services regulation is different 
from EMU, because the content of financial regulation creates specific winners and 
losers. By contrast, in the case of EMU winners and losers are not easily identifiable
(McNamara 1998).
From a methodological point of view, a suitable way of proceeding would be through 
several  paired  or  multiple  in-depth  comparisons  of  EU  negotiations  involving 
different arenas and policy areas, which determine the scope conditions and which 
can  also  be  seen  as  intervening  variables.  The  researcher  could  then  perform  a 
congruence  test,  checking whether  the  hypothesised relations  between  the 
independent variable – expertise – and the dependent ones - negotiation process and 
outcome - hold (or not) under different scope conditions (e.g. arenas located at high-
low levels of negotiations, policy areas with high-low political salience and public 
scrutiny). This congruence procedure could be supplemented by a detailed process 
tracing,  with  a  view  to  examine  the  specific  causal  mechanisms  at  work in  each 
specific  case (on  small  case  study  methodology  see  Gerring  2007,  George  and 
Bennett 2005).
Two caveats should however be kept in mind for future research. The first caveat is 
analytical: the different scope conditions identified can be separated analytically, but 
in practice it might be more difficult to do so, because they might also overlap in part. 
For  example,  some  arenas  that  bring  together  experts  with  a  strong  professional 
identity are likely to be arenas located at lower levels of negotiations (though not 
necessarily  as evidenced  by Verdun’s analysis of  the Committee  of Central Bank 18
Governors).  To address this potential problem, process tracing and elite interviews 
with the participants to the negotiations should prove to be valuable tools. The second 
caveat is empirical in that data gathering might be rendered more difficult by the fact 
that technical fora and experts working therein tend to avoid publicity and access for 
interviews might be limited, even though this also depends on the policy area.
Conclusions
This article has reviewed the literature on expertise in policy making and by extension 
in negotiations in the EU. It has identified two main gaps in the existing literature. 
The  first  gap  is  theoretical:  it  concerns  the  delineation  of  testable  hypotheses 
concerning scope  conditions  that  affect  the  role  played  by  expertise  in  EU 
negotiations. The second gap is empirical: there are very few works analysing the role 
of knowledge in the EU and EU negotiations more specifically. 
By conducting an extensive review of the literature, this article has identified several
functions that expertise can perform in EU negotiations and the causal mechanisms 
through which it may have an impact on the process and the outcome of negotiations 
in  the  EU.  The  socialising,  cognitive, legitimating  and  operational  functions of 
expertise are enhanced by specific conditions that can be formulated as hypotheses 
concerning  the arenas  of negotiations and the  policy  areas.  Methodologically,  the 
analytical leverage of these hypotheses could be gauged through congruence tests and 
process tracing, informed by policy analysis and elite interviews, based on a limited 
number  of  selected  case  studies  comparisons.  By  examining  the  empirical  record 
using  the  hypotheses  and  causal  mechanisms outlined in  this  paper  it should be 19
possible to gather a better understanding of the multi-faceted role played by expertise
in EU negotiations. 
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